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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THESIS
Definitions and Restrictions
To establish the honndaries for this study, the two 
major phrases in its title should be examined first* A cove­
nant not to compete, in the framework herein used, has been 
defined by the Internal Revenue Service to be simply, "an 
agreement whereby the seller of a business states that he
will not compete with the buyer for a limited time or within
1an agreed area or a combination of both*" Commerce Clearing
House describes the covenant not to compete with brevity,
"Agreements not to compete— Where the vendor of a business
covenants to refrain for a specified period from competing
2with the vendee . • .
Although the preceding two definitions could serve to 
identify a covenant, a more elaborate classification is neces-
^U* 8* Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, 
Tax Guide for Small Business » I967, Publication No* 33^ > P* 5-
^665 CCH 1965 STAND. FED. TAX. REP. Par. 4717*0971.
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sary* Essentially, the covenant not to compete is an agree­
ment to be included within, or to accompany, the contract for 
the sale of a business in which the seller agrees to refrain 
from certain or all of the activities of that business for a 
specified period of time and/or within a designated geograph­
ical area. Whether it is a part of the general sales agree­
ment or a separate item, the covenant constituks a contrac­
tual obligation of the seller. Its specific elements are:
(1) it is given by the seller of a business to the buyer for 
the buyer’s protection; (2) it is an agreement Iby which the 
seller is restrained from competing, partially or wholly, 
with the buyer; and (3) it may state a time period, a geograph­
ical area, or both, within which the defined competition is 
prohibited.
The matter of Ernest E. Suggs and &Iar.1orie S. Suggs v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue^ furnishes an example of a 
covenant not to compete which accompanied the sale of an in­
surance agency:
The seller further agrees that they will not for a 
period of five years from the date of this contract, 
directly or indirectly, engage in business as a gen­
eral insurance agent within a radius of 100 miles of 
Phoenix, Arizona, nor aid, nor assist anyone else in 
said business in said territory, except that it is 
agreed that Seller may retain their insurance agent’s 
licenses, and that as to insurance sold to any new 
accounts, such business shall be placed only through 
the office of the Buyer, the Seller to be compensated 
on the basis of fifty per cent (50%) of the commission 
payable on the entire premium, whether paid in advance
^E. E. Suggs. 24 can Tax Ct. Mem. 1194 (196*5).
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or paid in monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, or annual 
installments.
This study’s "Analysis Of Its (the covenant’s) Tax: Con­
sequences" will he a restricted one. Only federal income 
taxes and consequences resulting therefrom will he considered, 
although some parallels might he drawn for state income taxes 
since these often se^i to follow federal rulings. Further, 
the analysis is focused on a consideration of the relative cer­
tainty of the covenant’s tax consequences. Specifically, it 
is concerned with the designation of all or part of the sale 
proceeds, from the vie^vpoint of hoth huyer and seller, and 
how sure the parties can he of a given designation. The ob­
ject here is to observe what Impact the covenant has upon the 
tax consequences, and how certain that impact is in effecting 
one designation or another.
Finally, it should he noted that only sales of going 
businesses will he examined. Basically, a going "business is 
one which is pursuing its normal course of commerce, is oper­
ating as is customary to its kind of enterprise, and is not 
in the process of bankruptcy or dissolution.^
Nature of the Covenant
A covenant not to compete is, in itself, a contract or 
a promise in writing under seal. The unqualified word, "cove-
^ o r  a recent decision in the sale of an inoperative 
business, interested persons are referred to the matter of 
Savings Assurance Agency. Inc. v. C.I.R.. CCH Tax Ct. Mem./ 1 oA'J \ '
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nant," is sometimes used as a suTbstitute for the word "con­
tract." Therefore, if one were to look for information ahout 
the covenant not to compete (also called a negative covenant, 
agreement not to compete, restrictive agreement, or restric­
tive covenant) in commercial law publications, he would find 
it usually in the section dealing with contracts. Interest­
ingly enough, the covenant is found most often in a subsection 
entitled "Illegal Contracts." Contracts, or segments thereof, 
which provide for the restraint of trade or the limitation of 
competition are ordinarily deemed inimical to the public in­
terest and, therefore, illegal and unenforceable. Although 
the covenant not to compete has as its basic purpose the re­
straint of competition, it is one of the exceptions to the 
rule of illegal contracts and is valid when it is reserved 
to the sale of a going business. A number of other qualifi­
cations are necessary to establish the covenant’s legality 
and enforceability, but these will be illustrated in detail 
in Chapter II.
The Uniform Commercial Code, adopted or pending adop­
tion in nearly every jurisdiction in the United States at 
this writing, deals with agreements not to compete in its 
Section 2-302. The Code applies the rule of "unconscionabil- 
ity" to contracts for sale (closely allied to "illegality" and 
•inimical to the public interest*), and also deems the covenant 
to be in the nature of an exception under unconscionable con­
tracts.
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Necessity of the Goveiiajnt
The purchaser of a functioning enterprise obtains not 
only the physical assets of the firm, hut also what is often 
the most valuable asset, its goodwill* The latter has been 
variously defined, but, for the purposes of this study, it 
might best be deemed the potential of a business to realize 
earnings above a nonral return from the investment in its 
tangible assets* This intangible, goodwill, is the essence 
of the purcîiase of a going business*
Should the seller of a business retake, or attempt to 
retake, the physical assets of the business he had sold, he 
would be subject to prosecution for burglary, robbery, or 
larceny— the exact crime dependent upon the method employed* 
However, the possibly most valuable asset, the goodwill, is 
his for the retaking in the absence of a contractual agreement 
prohibiting such action. If any goodwill does in fact exist, 
it is the seller who built it through his business acumen, 
his customer dealings, and his intimate knowledge of the enter­
prise* It is not unreasonable to believe that he could easily 
decimate his old business by starting a new one in competition. 
Substantial in any case, depletion of a personal service busi­
ness by seller competition could be ruinous to the buyer— re­
capture estimates run as high as ninety-five per cent of the 
business sold in the case of insurance agencies, according to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
one authority,
From a practical viewpoint, physical assets— all other 
things equal— could he resold without great loss in the event 
of dissipation of the husinees from seller raids. Regardless 
of the volume of "business heing transacted in the enterprise 
(short of accelerated wear and tear which would he inversely 
related to loss of huslness), a typewriter remains much the 
same item as does a desk, chair, filing cabinet, and so on.
However, goodwill establishment is a function of time; 
its existence and solidity vary directly with the passage of 
time. For the buyer, goodwill may not imve a form and amount 
capable of early resale. He must have time to build his own 
goodwill in the business, and he must be free from untoward 
competition in order to do so satisfactorily. Therefore, this 
intangible, goodwill, is an item which could be most severely 
damaged by seller raids and open animosity. Thus, the cove­
nant not to compete is a necessity in agreements for the pur­
chase and sale of going businesses. Subject to its stated 
limits of time and area, a covenant legally removes the un­
certainty of seller competition with the buyer and gives the 
buyer sufficient opportunity to establish his own goodwill.
In addition, by his execution of the covenant, the seller
^Charles VV, Tye, "Legal Problems of Insurance Agents—  
Expirations," Readings in Property and Casualty Insurance.
H, Wayne Snider (eii.) (Homewood, 111.: Richard D* Irwin, Inc.,
1959), p. ZZi*.
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provides tangible evidence of his good faith, and intention to 
refrain from such abnormal competition.
By its Inherent powers, the covenant not to compete may 
well enable a proper, arm's length sale of goodwill. The buy­
er, therefore, is willing to pay a price, and the seller can 
receive a sum, both of whfch exceed the value of the business* 
tangible assets.
Statement of Thesis
Up to this point, there would seem to be no legitimate 
criticism of the covenant, no valid reason to omit this item 
from a properly—drafted contract of sale. However, accompany­
ing the Introduction of the covenant not to compete there ap­
pears to be a heightened degree of uncertainty in the federal 
income tax désignât!on(s) of the sale proceeds. The problem 
can be stated as follows: Does the covenant not to compete
achieve greater certainty of eliminating future competition 
from the seller at the cost of diminishing certainty in the 
federal income tax designation(s) of the purchase monies?
This problem has two broad categories, the first of 
which is: just how certain is the protection afforded buyer
from a covenant not to compete? V*hen are the terras of a 
covenant not to compete too restrictive of trade and compe­
tition to be valid? If the time and area are too great, will 
the covenant be declared wholly unenforceable, or will the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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court amend Its terms to Toe enforceable? What reliefs can 
the Touyer seek if seller violates his agreements? Essen­
tially, therefore, the first part of the proTolem is to deter­
mine if a covenant not to compete actually does accomplish 
what it purports to do— to eliminate future competition from 
the seller for a specified period of time and within a desig­
nated geographical area.
The second portion of the prolilem is similarly complex. 
It requires that one determine how uncertain the tax designa- 
tion(s) of the purchase monies would "be in the alasence of a 
covenant, and then to ascertain what difference (if any) is 
traceal)le to the inclusion of the covenant. Is this truly a 
matter of tmcertainty, or is it simply hard to understand—  
a matter for expertise? In male ing a tax designation and an 
allocation of proceeds to the agreement not to coiapete, what 
criteria are applied?
Approach for Resolution of Thesis
Of course, the proTalem and its implicit questions are 
of a legal nature. Therefore, to implement the process of 
resolution, information must tie sought in legal, or law- 
oriented, putjlications. Business la%r texts and germane govern­
ment publications, as well as periodicals, can serve well as 
routing indicators in the matter. However, to make any truly 
conclusive kind of analysis, one must look to the ultimate
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
designators of contract validity and tax status of proceeds 
and payments— the courts of record.
This study shall utilize the pertinent publications to 
obtain general background material and citations of cases 
relevant to the problem. It shall provide its summary and 
conclusions through a careful probe of the recorded cases, 
the evidences of ultimate designations.
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CHAPTER II 
VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF COVENANT 
History and Rules of Validity
Agreements not to compete were held to he void in such 
early cases as Cyrus Alger v. George C. Thacher^ dated March, 
1837. Covenants which impaired competition were invalidated 
hy the courts on the grounds that they: (1) exposed the pub­
lic to monopoly; (2) deprived the public of the services of 
the covenantor; (3) reduced desirable competition; and (4) 
impaired the covenantor’s means to earn a livelihood. Basic­
ally, the covenant was viewed as a measure to restrain trade 
and, therefore, inimical to the best interests of the public.
As time passed, some courts began to regard this nega­
tive covenant to be valid if it accompanied the sale of a go­
ing business and was limited in length of time and geograph­
ical area. In I9I8 , the case of J . R . Shute v. J. T. Shute^ 
resulted in the covenant being voided, but the court noted 
that it would have been enforced had the period of time been
^Alger V. Thacher. 19 Pick (Alass. ) 5I (1837).
2shute V. Shute. 1?6 N.C. 462, 97 S.E. 392 (I9I8 ).
10
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shorter.
Gradually> the concept of "reasonableness" in the re­
straints was introduced, and the terms of a covenant would be 
upheld so long as they were reasonable and not contrary to 
public policy, Becbzer Colletre of Business Administration and 
Secretarial Science v, Sumner H, Gross^ in 1933 set forth this 
approach and advised that . what is reasonable depends
upon the facts of each case,"
A 1953 matter, Sîaola Ice Cream C o m m n y  of North Caro­
lina, Inc. V. Mao la Milk and Ice Cream Comuany.^ contains two 
concepts which are germane to covenants to the present date.
In the first of these concepts can be found the essence of 
rulings on the reasonableness of covenants not to ctmpete:
An agreement in partial restraint of trade contained 
in a contract for the sale of a business is reasonable 
if the restraint is such as to afford a fair protection 
to the interests of the party to whose favor it is given 
and not so large as to interfere with the interests of 
the public. However, contracts in partial restraint of 
trade are contrary to public policy and void if nothing 
shows them to be reasonable.
The court’s findings further noted that a reasonable geograph­
ic area for restriction would be limited to a well-defined 
territory which had been served by the seller prior to the 
sale. Reasonableness in time was indicated as that sufficient
^Becker Coll erre of Business Administration v. Gross. 
281 Mass. 355, 183 N.E. 765 119331“.
^Maola Ice Cream Co., Inc. v, Maola Milk & Ice Cream 
Co.. 238 M.c. 317, 77 S.E. 2d 910 {1953H
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for a competent 'busineBsnian to establish his legitimate inter­
ests in the enterprise which he Imd purchased, a length of 
time which would vary from one type of business to another, 
but would not normally exceed three to five years.
In its second conceptual area, this same case reiter­
ates Chapter I*s observation regarding the buyer's relative 
lack of protection for goodwill in the absence of a covenant 
not to compete:
Generally, in the absence of an agreement as to 
the right to compete, vendor of premises and its 
goodwill is not precluded from engaging in a similar 
business in the vicinity, provided he does not inter­
fere with purchaser’s enjoyment of the premises sold 
and provided he does not engage in unfair competition.
In 1935» the matter of J . L . Donahue v. Permacel Tape 
Corporation^ prescribed who was to decide the question of 
reasonableness and elaborated on the criteria with a quote 
from »i il liston on Contracts (Section I636, page 4380) :
It is everywhere agreed tiiat in order to be valid 
a promise imposing a restraint in trade or occupation 
must be reasonable. The question of reasonableness is 
for the court, not the jury; and in considering what 
is reasonable, regard for the question must be paid to 
(a) whether the promise is wider than is necessary for 
the protection of the covenantee in some legitimate 
interest, (b) the effect of the promise upon the cove­
nantor, and (c) the effect upon the public . . . .
^Donahue v. Permacol Tape Corp.« (Ind. Sup. Ct.)
127 N.E. 2d 235 (195571
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Further, this case also serves to illustrate in the court’s 
own words what can he the fate of covenants not to compete 
which are not reasonable in time and/or area:
We cannot re^Tite the contract made hy the parties 
and add to it matters which it does not contain and 
then use the contract as rewritten as a hasis for 
litigation, however justifiable equitable interference 
under the circumstances might seem to he* We conclude, 
therefore, the covenant of contract upon which this 
action is predicated is unenforceable in its entirety.
Thus, if the covenant’s terras are not reasonable in the 
opinion of the court, the entire covenant may he declared void. 
Such an approach follows the general reluctance of the courts 
to modify and construe contracts. As a rule, cases which were 
examined followed the practice of voiding the entire covenant 
when its restrictions were too broad, leaving the buyer with­
out protection. In several cases, by the time that the buyer 
could bring his case to court, the time limit in the covenant 
had already expired— for all practical purposes, the subse­
quent invalidation by the court was superfluous, except to 
prevent collection for damages, for purposes of injunction.
Some state courts did modify the terms of the covenant 
not to compete to be reasonable. Here the assumption was that 
the parties must have envisioned some restraints when they en­
tered into the original agreement for sale. Thus, to avoid 
restraint entirely would amount effectively to a material 
amendment of the terras. The matter of Georgette N. Thomas v.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Toufilc PaTcer^ is an example of such a modification. Origin­
ally, the agreement in this case called for the defendant to 
refrain from engaging directly or indirectly in the taker 
business for a period of seven years within a radius of seven 
miles from the business which he had sold to the plaintiff. 
These limitations were held to he unreasonable, but the judge 
amended them to four years and four miles rather than to void 
the covenant entirely. He identified the covenant as a nega­
tive covenant since it was an agreement not to do something. 
Are there any rules of thumb regarding time and area 
restrictions which can be relied upon by contracting parties, 
particularly buyers, to be reasonable? One text^ indicates 
that three years tends to be tlie maximum safe limit on time 
which a covenant may embody. This conclusion coincides well 
with this study as in no case examined was a three year time 
limit considered unreasonable,
The trade area within which a firm’s transactions have 
been conducted previously is readily establishable for busines­
ses with a fixed, localized clientele. This would constitute 
a defensible geographic restriction. Where the firm has ca­
tered to a transient customer group, the question of area be-
^Thomaa v. faker. 32? Mass, 339, 93 N.E. 2d 640 (1951).
^A, Aide Charles, College Law For Business (Cincinnati; 
South—Western Publishing Company, 1963), pi 661
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comes somewhat nelnilous. No concrete rule of thumh appears 
to he available regarding territorial restrictions where the 
trade area is not readily definable, hut in the cases examined 
wherein these kinds of restrictions were invalidated, the ex­
cesses were somewliat overt. Where the hîisiness had been of a 
localized nature, the area restriction was extended to a major 
portion of the state of domicile, or to the entire state; intra- 
state businesses attempted to restrict the United States from 
competition* In hoth time and area constraints, a very conserv­
ative approach would he advisable if the buyer desires a high 
degree of certainty in the legal enforceability of what is pre­
scribed.
Covenant Enforceability
A covenant not to compete constitutes a contractual ob­
ligation of the seller, Tlie point of consideration given for 
it by the buyer will be developed in Chapter III, but essen­
tially any part of the purciiase price may be allocated to the 
covenant, it ;aay be separately measured and drawn, or its con­
sideration may be deemed indivisible from the entire sale pro­
ceeds. Violations of a valid covenant*s terms constitute a 
breach of contract,
A3 an initial enforcement of the contract, a competing 
seller may be enjoined from such action in violation of his 
legal promise. The matter of Thomas v. ia~:or« cupra, note 6,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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this chapter, noted tliat ", , , the coTenant may he enforced 
hy injunction if the interests to he protected are consonant 
with public policy and if the restraint is limited reasonably 
in time and space."
Where damages are positive and provable hy buyer, an 
appropriate award may accrue to the injured party as in Whit- 
ing Mille Commnies v. William J, 0*Connell^ where it %vas 
noted, "Contracts in restraint of trade • • • may he • , . en­
forced in equity • • • • Damages may be aivarded for interfer­
ence within a reasonable time and space if vendee is injured,"
What constitutes damages, as far as the sum is concerned, 
is more readily ascertainable where the covenant is valued in 
the contract as a separate item, or is handled wholly as a sep­
arate contract. In some cases the rule is that installment 
payments for a covenant cease from the point of violation as 
in Emmette L. Barran and Martha Bar ran, et al v. Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue^ Seller is obliged to return the subse­
quent payments received, and is entitled to no further payment. 
Other cases, such as Fred Montes i and Carmel a Montes! v. Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue. p r o v i d e  for fixed damages as 
agreed to in the contract of sale. The court must determine
% hiting Milk Cos, v. O'Connell. 277 Mass. 570 (1931).
9e.L. Barran v. C.I.R.. (CA-5), CCH 6i*-2 U.S. Tax Cas, 
Par. 9611, 334 F . (2d) W " U 9 6 4 ) .
^Qf . Montes! v. C.I.R.. (CA-6), CCH 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
Par. 9173, y*0 F. (2d>‘̂ 7  (1965).
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damages in many cases on tiie "basis of proof offered ty the 
"buyer, as in Metropolitan Ice Comnany v. James J. Ducas.
Regardless of the many avenues for enforcement of a 
covenant, legal remedies may he inadequate to the long-range 
harm done by violations* The buyer often purchases a going 
"iaisiness, paying for goodwill in addition to tangible assets, 
in the contemplation of securing his economic future* Only 
time, without undue competition and with his good performance, 
may seem necessary to solidify this plan* With seller compe­
tition, the buyer may find himself in a situation worse than 
if he had bought only the physical appurtenances of a firm 
since he paid for more. Customer relationships may be so im­
paired by seller raids and open animosity that the better 
clients seek a third firm with which to deal rather than "be­
come involved in an unsavory situation. Many nationally— 
prominent firms thrive in spite of proxy battles, suits for 
patent infringements, and other competitive j oustings so long 
as the artiForlk: on the product label remains the same* Local 
enterprises, however, with buyer and seller sharing many of 
the same friends and acquaintances are especially susceptible 
to competition backlash. Whether such rivalry is in v ü a t i o n  
of a protective covenant or not, its disruption could be ex­
tremely perilous to the firm, mentally and fiscally ruinous
11Metrono1itan Ice Go* v* Ducas» ip6 N.E, 857 (1935).
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to a new entrepreneur trying to 1mlId hie own goodwill.
Is a Covenant Necessary in an 
Otherwise Desirable Purciiase?
In view of the mitigating considerations regarding the 
enforcement of a covenant not to compete, this question must 
arise. If the covenant is included due to a lack of trust be­
tween the parties, the whole matter should he reviewed. In 
the absence of such evidence, and where there is a clear and 
obvious meeting of the minds, some persons might deem a writ­
ten agreement not to compete to be superfluous.
There are a number of sound reasons in support of the 
inclusion of a covenant. The first, and perhaps most basic, 
cause is that the Uniform Commercial Code (Section 2-201), 
as the old English Statute of Frauds, requires contracts for 
sales of $500 or more to be in writing to be enforceable.
If the parties are dealing with a matter of competition for 
which a value of this amount or more can be ascribed, they 
must at least mention it in written form.
Other considerations coincide with the reasons for 
reducing nearly any important agreement to written, legal 
form. One needs always to consider that the party with whom 
he dealt and enjoyed freedom from doubts may die. His heirs, 
whose name alone may be sufficient for strong competition, 
may be less scrupulous and imy have no intention to be bound 
by the terms of the decedent's unrecorded promises.
Inclusion of a covenant not to compete in the contrac—
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
19
tuai agreements may force the contracting parties to a more 
thorough understanding, a hatter meeting of the minds ahout 
future competition. If the seller is sincere ahout refrain­
ing from competition, he should he willing to sign a legal 
instrument which defines and details such abstinence. His 
willingness to do so, or lacic thereof, is significant. Fur­
ther, consideration of the matter in detail may avoid un\7ar- 
ranted litigation after the signing, including some unfore­
seen tax consequences which will he detailed in the next two 
chapters. So that the parties may Imow, before and after, 
that to which they have agreed, and so that others may also 
he properly informed, the matter must he discussed and reduced 
to written form*
The cmnner of payment places a heavier hurden on one 
or the other of the parties to he very clear ahout the cove­
nant’s terms. In a cash transaction, Tmyer must give up the 
entire consideration in advance of seller’s demonstration 
that he will honor his agreement not to compete. The more 
thoroughly the parties discuss the transaction, the more will 
huyer have the opportunity to gauge seller’s intentions on 
each point and on the whole matter. Further, seller is simi­
larly given a chance to observe the buyer’s behavior in this 
and other areas, and thereby to know better with what kind of 
man he is dealing.
Â sale which embodies deferred payments may require 
even more care in assuring mutual understanding because of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
the futurity factor. The huyer may he inclined to cease mak­
ing payments if he believes that seller is acting in violation 
of the agreement as he (buyer) understands it. On the other 
hand, buyer may find seller more quickly on the verge of com­
peting should the seller become anxious about the manner in 
which the new owner is operating and thereby affecting his 
(lxiyer*s) ability to complete the payment schedule. This time 
element creates strong anxieties for both parties, and a thor­
ough pre-sale understanding is a helpful preventive for such 
tensions. Again, a detaibd covenant with prescribed penalties 
forces more questions to be resolved before the sale.
Summary and Conclusions About Protection
On first probe, a covenant not to ctmipete may appear 
to be little more than a legal latch on the door. There is 
the difficulty of constructing a valid agreement, and then, 
should violations occur, of enforcing it— with possibly little 
hope of full compensation in a long-range practical sense. 
However, reasonableness of the covenant's terms can be estab­
lished within conservative limits, and, if buyer bargains in 
terms of minimum time and provable trade area, he can be rea­
sonably certain of his legal protection.
Although the buyer may appear to be the favored party 
in considerations about the covenant, it should be kept in 
mind that this agreement well may be the implement which en-
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al)les seller to market his goodwill. In any given case where 
seller competition could he detrimental, the sale proceeds 
would prohahly he less without the inclusion of a protective 
covenant•
In summation, therefore, the initial portion of the 
problem statement is activated. A properly conceived and 
drafted covenant not to compete does achieve greater certain­
ty of eliminating future competition hy the seller, and it 
accomplishes this in two respects. First, within the limita­
tions of reasonahlenesa in its restrictions, the covenant pro­
vides an enforceahle legal harrier against seller competition. 
Secondly, and in the practical sense more importantly, a cove­
nant wrought from arm’s length bargaining actualizes its pro­
tection hy: (1) requiring the parties to entertain considera­
tions about future competition more thoroughly while they are 
at the bargaining table; (2) helping to make the parties more 
aware of the restrictions on competition and the consequences 
for violations; (3) causing each party to reveal himself more 
fully to the other in his concepts and intentions regarding 
future competition; and (4) bringing the parties into a more 
complete understanding and meeting of the minds than would 
have occurred otherwise. Without a covenant, it is extremely 
doubtful tliat any of these conditions would exist to the ex­
tent that its existence effectively insures.
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CHA.PTEH III
TAX CONSEQUENCES OVEKVIEi?
INGOIE TAX TREAT..iENT
Without Covenant
When a going twsiness is sold, the assets included 
must he classified in three different categories in order 
to determine the proper designation of the gain or loss on 
each particular asset: (1) capital assets; (2) real prop­
erty and depreciable property used in the trade or business 
and held for more tlian six months; and <3) all other prop­
erty* Although a detailed explaimtion of the accounting 
methods employed in the taxation of each of these categories 
is beyond the scope or needs of this study, some elaboration 
about them is necessary* Initially, the basis of gain and 
its proper designation for each will be outlined, assuming 
a sale effected without a covenant not to compete* Follow­
ing tils, the same kinds of infornîation will be presented 
relevant to the covenant*
Taking the assets in reverse order to the categories 
indicated in the preceding paragraph, Uie items properly 
includible in the "all other" group would be such as stock—
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in-Crade, inventory, or property used in the business and held for six 
months or less. Cost is the basis for calculating gain on items in this 
category, less accvuaulated depreciation (if any), and the gain which 
results from the sale would be considered as an ordinary gain.
The assets in category two, real property and depreciable prop­
erty used in the trade or business and held for more tlian six months, 
come under Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,^ Again, 
cost is the usual basis for such property, although other bases may be 
applicable, with an adjustment made for depreciation. If the adjusted 
basis is a result of straight-line depreciation, amortization, or de­
pletion taken, then gain to the extent of such adjustment will be con­
sidered ordinary and placed in category three, luat which exceeds re­
covery of previously-deducted amounts will be placed In category one as 
a capital gain. Essentially, items in category two are sucn as build­
ings, machinery, furniture, fixtures, laim, lease-holds, patents, and 
copyrights— all of which have been held for more than tiie six montas' 
period.
Other than that portion of items incluued iu category two
^Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (St. Taul, hinn.; West Puolisuing 
Co., 1954). pp. 373-370.
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TThlch is properly allocated to category one, capital assets, 
the major component of capital assets in the sale of a going 
"business is goodwill. As indicated in Section 1221 of the 
Code,^ goodwill is an intangible capital asset of a taisiness 
which is not subject to depreciation or maortization. If it 
is included in a resale, its basis will ordinarily be its pre­
vious cost* In the absence of this, however, there is no one 
method which is exclusively correct in establishing its al­
ternative basis, the fair market value*
Without being so presumptuous as to suggest a sole, 
proper approach to calculating the fair market value of good­
will, Ixit with the latent knowledge of having examined many 
tax court cases, this study will suggest one method apparent­
ly acceptable to the Internal Revenue Service* A normal re­
turn from the investment in tangible assets for the particu­
lar kind of enterprise is obtained through examining germane 
key ratios procurable from Dun and Bradstreet* The current 
three to five years* return from the business in question is 
then compared to the noriml return. If a positive difference 
results in favor of the subject business, this is capitalized 
at the prevailing rate of interest. Following this approach, 
the ability of the firm to realize earnings above a normal re­
turn from the investment in its tangible assets will have been 
demonstrated in a manner previously accepted by the Internal
2lbid., p. 372.
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Reveime Service.
Once the proper has is lias heen determined for each of 
the assets, the selling price mnst he allocated among all of 
them on the ratio that each hears to the total of the hases. 
It is in this manner that gain (or loss) is properly deter­
mined for each component. Essentially, therefore, the proper 
allocation and designation of a sale without a covenant is a 
function of proper hases, previous deductions ta&en, time 
held, and sale price. In the aggregate, that which is recov­
ery of investment and ordinary gain to the seller estahlishes 
huyer*s hase for resale and, in the appropriate areas, deprec­
iation (or amortization or depletion). In the case of long 
term capital gain to the seller, one-half is excludihle from 
taxable income and the balance is taxed at a rate not to ex­
ceed twenty—five per cent on the total gain, basically. No 
future deductions may he taken through depreciation, amorti­
zation, or depletion on this portion hy the huyer; it simply 
creates his hase for possible resale.
Although the preceding has heen a considerable under­
statement of the intricacies involved in such affairs, the 
fact remains that there are definite, established, approved 
methods for accomplishing the end objective— allocation and 
designation for federal income tax purposes. The procedures 
are liard to understand— matters for expertise— hut there are 
knowable approaches, and the degree of risk in erring is low
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when the proper technicians Imndle the matter.
Treatment of Covenant
Ko organisation such as Dun and Bradstreet exists to 
aid in the proper valuation of a covenant not to compete, and 
its designation is not definable in terms of cost, deprecia­
tion, and time. The Internal Devenue Service, in its hoohlet 
entitled Tax Guide For Small Euslness « furnishes criteria for 
the covenant’s proper designation (none for valuation) as fol­
lows:^
Where a portion of the purclmse price is for a
covenant not to com-Deto, and the covenant is for a 
f ixed number of years, the amount paid for the cove— 
no.nt is deductible as a business expense proportion­
ately over the life of the covenant* If no portion 
of the purchase price represents an amount paid for 
a covenant not to compete, Init the contract of pur­
chase rs'iuires you (purcliaser) to maîce periodic pay­
ments in return for such a covenant, you may deduct 
such payments as a business expense. To do this you 
Eïust be able to establish that the amount you paid 
was for a covenant not to compete and was not, in 
effect, the purchase of goodwill.
If a covenant not to compete accompanies the 
transfer of goodwill and it has the function of 
assuring you (ptircliaser) the beneficial enjoynont 
of the goodwill you acquire, the covenant becomes 
nonseverable o.nd its cost is considered a capital 
asset which, like goodwill, is not subject to de­
preciation or amortization.
As the preceding advices imply, there is a divergence 
of effects on the contracting parties* tax designations,, A
^ü.S,, Treasury Department, loo, cit,
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good illustration of this may he found in Benjamin Levinson 
and Florence LeTlnson. et al t* Cotmnissioner of Internal 
Revenue^ in I966. In this case, the court noted that the 
Commissioner had assumed a neutral stand "• • • recognizing 
tliat if we find that the payments were for a covenant not 
to compete, they are deductible hy the "buyers and taxable as 
ordinary income to the sellers, or, if we find that the pay­
ments were for goodwill, they are not deductible by the buy­
ers but are taxable as capital gain to the seller,"
The following hypothetical example illustrates the 
difference in tax impact or burden in a very simplified 
situation. The assumptions are that these are individual 
(non—corporate) taxpayers who are married and filing joint 
returns, that each has net taxable income exclusive of the 
covenant amounting to $12,000, and tJmt A has sold a going 
business to B in a transaction which calls for B to pay A 
$3,000 per year for A's covenant not to compete. This cove­
nant was valued by the parties with the mutual understanding 
and belief that it would be designated in its payments as 
ordinary income to A and, therefore, be deductible by the 
buyer, B, With their net taxable incomes exclusive of the 
covenant payment, each principal would have a marginal tax 
rate of 25^ on the next $4,000 of taxable income which he 
receives. If the tax situation were to stand as contem—
^B, Levinson, et al. 45 T.C, 380 (I966),
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plated Toy the parties, therefore, B*s situation would he un­
changed as all of the $3,000 required to make the annual pay­
ment would he deductible from net income before taxes. For A, 
25^ of the $3>000, or $750, would accrue to taxes, and he would 
realize $2,250 net each year— all other things being equal. 
Should this designation be declared improper, however, say 
the covenant is deemed to be given for the beneficial enjoyment 
of the goodwill that B purchased (and thereby Inseparable from 
goodwill), the tax picture changes considerably. In order to 
have $3*000 net income after taxes with which to make the pay­
ment, B would have to earn $4,000 before taxes, net. Of the 
$3,000 payment received by A, one-half, or $1,500 would be ex- 
cludible as a long term capital gain. The tax on the remain­
ing $1,500 at 25$ would be $375* thus leaving A with a net 
payment of $2,625, an increase of $375 from the previous sit­
uation. However, the federal government is the real gainer 
in such cases as it now receives a total of $1,375* where its 
previous income was the $750 tax paid by A.
The difference in the parties* marginal tax rates can 
make the disparity wider or narrower, depending upon the change 
in designation. In the case of corporations, higher taxes can 
result in the capital asset designation of the covenanlte pro­
ceeds since corporations do not enjoy the one—half exclusion 
on long term capital gains.
Regardless of tiie aritlimetic involved in a changed 
designation, and how much additional taxes the government may
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gain, the fact remains that the parties envisioned a differ­
ent structure in their bargaining, and the change results in 
a distortion of the agreement. Had seller known that he would 
enjoy capital gains tax treatment on the proceeds, instead of 
ordinary income, he would likely have heen willing to accept 
a lower sum. On the other hand, had the huyer known that his 
payments would have to come from after—taxes dollars, he well 
may have heen unwilling to pay as much.
How much of a disconcerting effect this changeling 
situation may have depends upon the certainty which the part­
ies have in effecting one designation or another. This, of 
course, is a function of heing ahle to follow the criteria 
laid down hy the designating entity. The criteria will he 
closely examined for reliability and precision in Chapter IV, 
hut it is necessary to trace the steps in the processes of 
allocation and designation first to enable one to identify 
the allocators and designators in order of authority.
Initially, the parties to the contract of purchase 
and sale discuss the value of each component in their nego­
tiations, Presumably, each is concurrently mentally desig­
nating each item in terms of his own tax structure in order 
to determine how many net dollars will he required to pay 
for the firm (buyer's conteo^lations as to the deductibility 
of his payments, wholly or partially), and how much of the 
proceeds will he realized after taxes (seller's approach).
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Next, if a contract is effected, the allocations may 
he inserted into the instrument, in fact or implicitly. In 
some few cases examined, the income tax designation nay also 
he specifically mentioned, as it was contemplated hy the 
parties to the agreement, as in Beniamin Levinson, et al, 
sunra, note 4, this chapter.
Following the execution of the contract, each party 
must make hoth an allocation and a designation of the pro­
ceeds in his income tax return. The Internal Revenue Service 
then screens tie return, and, if it agrees with taxpayer’s con­
clusions, the matter essentially ends at that point. However, 
if a discrepancy is noted, the taxpayer will he notified to 
that effect with a statement of the amount of deficiency (this 
study is not concerned with overpayments). The taxpayer then 
must pay the deficient sum. If he refuses to pay, the Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue will instigate criminal action 
against him. On the other hand, if he pays and wishes to dis­
pute the matter, a hearing with the Cozmnissloner is requested. 
If the taxpayer is still dissastM'ied after such a hearing, 
he then may instigate legal action against the Commissioner, 
Thus, in the case of Commissioner against the taxpayer, or 
taxpayer against Coimaissiœier, the ultimate allocator and 
designator is the tax court. It is the tax court’s criteria 
for allocation and designation which must he followed to avoid 
uncertainty in the tax treatment. The question is: Can these
criteria he followed?
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CHAPTER IT
COVENANT TAX DESIGNATION AND ALLOCATION 
ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY
Contradictions in the Courts
In determining the validity and enforceahility of the 
covenant from the protection standpoint, the courts rely upon 
the criterion of reasonableness consonant with the public in­
terest. As indicated in Chapter II, concepts of time and geo­
graphic area in support of reasonableness can be definitely 
expressed in conservative terms. It was concluded that a high 
degree of protective certainty could be assured by adhering to 
the previously court-approved restraints of three years in 
time and the provable trade area. Are there any such readily 
discernible concepts which support the designative and alloca­
tive criteria of the tax courts?
First, one needs to look at the general criteria used 
by these courts in designating the covenant not to compete.
In its 1965 Standard Federal Tax Reports,^ Commerce Clearing 
House sets forth two broad criteria which are essentially the
^665 CCH STAND. FED. TAX REP., Par. k?l7*0977*
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same as the guidelines indicated hy the courts in that portion 
of each case where the opinion is introduced*
1) Where an agreement not to compete accompanies 
the transfer of goodwill in the sale of a going husi— 
ness and it is apparent that the covenant not to com­
pete has the function primarily of assuring to the 
purchaser the beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill he 
has acquired, the agreement is regarded as nonsever- 
able and as being in effect a contri tu ting element to 
the assets transferred, and hence gain therefrom is 
treated entirely as a capital gain.
2) Where the covenant not to compete is dealt 
with as a separate item in the sale of a business, 
payment received for the covenant is ordinary income.
To illustrate the application of these criteria in the 
courts. Commerce Clearing House cites fourteen exemplary cases 
for the first category, and seventeen such cases for the sec­
ond. Most of these imtters are of recent (current ten years) 
adjudication, but some older cases are cited to show develop­
ment over time. In an attempt to determine if any basic con­
cepts from these cases had been used with a high degree of 
consistency, or certainty, in supporting either of the desig­
native criteria, all of them were analyzed in detail. Thir­
teen additional cases, all recent and pertaining to the same 
matter, were also examined.
The criteria for designating the tax status of the 
covenant are generally well-known and established in the tax 
courts, but in the form indicated by Commerce Clearing House,
One other highly pervasive guideline should be added* "All 
of the facts and circumstances of each case must be considered,"
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Using these forms of criteria, the tax courts have the consid­
erable task of determining when and under what conditions a 
covenant is given "primarily" to assure the purchaser of the 
"beneficial enjoyment of the goodwill he has acquired," and 
what constitutes dealing with the covenant as a "separate item 
in the sale of a business,"
From the forty-four legal battles analyzed, ten basic 
concepts have been selected for illustration. These concepts 
are of a type which might reasonably be expected to transcend 
the boundaries of any case or set of cases, as will be appar­
ent, The matter of certainty in the tax designation of the 
covenant not to compete will also become obvious as these 
cases arc ’
One of the concepts advanced throughout the cases is 
that an allocation of a portion of the purchase price to the 
covenant not to compete constitutes evidence that the parties 
dealt with the covenant as a separate item. Consequently, in 
Ernest E, Suggs, supra, note 3, Chapter I, when $50,250 of 
the total of $72,000 paid for the Suggs* insurance business 
was allocated in the contract to the covenant, it was desig­
nated by the court as ordinary income. The court stated,
"The value agreed upon as evidenced by the executed contract 
is all we have to measure , , * •" However, in Joseph Faulk­
ner and Marjorie FaulTmer v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.^
^J, Faulkner, 15 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 1?5 (1956).
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'wi'th. $10,000 of ’tlie tot&l price of $29»250 ascril)ed in the 
contract for tiie restrictive covenant, the court said that 
"* • . allocations within a contract do not make the proceeds 
ordinary income,” and designated the entire sum as from the 
sale of a capital asset.
Conversely, where no allocation is made Id the cove­
nant in the contract, the admission has heen in support of 
the nonseverahi 1 i ty of the covenant and treatment of the 
proceeds as a capital asset. Therefore, in Edward A. Eennev 
and Estate of Helen V. Kenney, Deceased, etal v. Coiaaiissioner 
of Internal Revenue.^ where no part of a $35,000 purchase 
price was allocated to the covenant, the court noted that 
"neither party placed any independent value on the covenant 
not to compete, and we can ascribe none to it," In another 
case wherein there was no allocation to the covenant, however, 
Williamson & Vi'ai te. Inc. v. United States of America,^ it was 
observed by the court that while the contract did not specify 
any portion of the total consideration of $25,000 as applic­
able to the covenant, such was the "dominant and controlling 
asset" timt $18,?50 was allocated to it and designated as 
ordinary income.
Another concept often advanced to negate any value of 
a covenant not to compete ic the inability of the covenantor
3e .A, IConney. 37 T.C, 1161 (Acq,) (1962).
^Yilliamson & Waite. Inc.. Cdl 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
Far. 9163 (l96i).
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to compete* This was considered relevant and admissible in 
George J* Aitïceii and Elizabeth M. Aitken v* Commissioner of
tfInternal Revenue.-̂  where the court found that the covenant 
liad no worth, stating, "Because of his ill health at the time 
of entry into this contract, petitioner would not liave heen 
physically ahle to compete with (huyer)*" A little over three 
years later, the court was unimpressed with this concept and, 
in Charles \V* Ealthroioe a.ml Mary W* Ealthrone v. Commissioner 
of Internal Bevenue*^ it stated that, "In this ce se, the ill 
health of seller only established an urgency to the sale."
The allocation to the covenant vm,B upheld as ordinary income* 
The point at which the covenant enters the negotia­
tions, relative to the time when the purcîiaee price is set, 
is a concept often noted* In James G* Thompson v* Comais- 
6ioner of Internal Revenue,^ the total purciiaee price was 
agreed upon before the parties discussed the covenant not 
to compete. Disallowing any allocation to the covenant, the 
court declared, "Coming as it did after the price liad heen 
fixed, it (the covenant*s allocation) can iiardly he taken 
as heing part of the bargained-for consideration." Such con­
ceptual logic was unimportant to the court in the matter of
5c.J. Aitken. 35 T.C. 22? (i960).
^C.W. Balthrone. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Hem* 1^6 H 9 6 k ) ,
^J.G. Thompson. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem* 1196 (1964)*
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Anthony Roclr. v. Commissioner of Internal Reyemie»^ Rocîc ar­
rived at an agreed price of $108,000 for his minority stock 
interest in a dairy. ïîien, on the day of the contract’s 
execution, two agreements were presented— one for $63,000 
for stock and another of $4^,000 for a separate covenant.
The allocation to the covenant ivas upheld.
In Bertha Schwartz: and Harry Schrartz v. Commissioner 
of Internal R e v e n u e an allocation of $110,000 of the total 
price of $725,000 paid petitioners for their markets— speci­
fied in the contract as for the covenant not to compete— was 
disallowed for heing "unrealistic." However, petitioner’s 
plea in Beniamin Levinson, sunra. note 4, Chapter III, that 
$142,000 of the $147,000 purchase price received hy him was 
unrealistioally allocated to the covenant was rejected. The 
court noted that it realized that a more realistic allocation 
might have heen made and that the allocation included in the 
subject contract was made at the insistence of purchasers 
acutely aware of the tax consequences, hut it rejected unreal- 
ism as in impinging concept.
Whether the installment payments for a covenant not 
to compete cease upon actual competition has heen a concept 
for testing the agreement’s authenticity. In Eramette L. Bar—
^A. Rock. 21 GCE Tax Ct. Mem. 46 (1962).
°B. Schwartz. 19 CCH Tax Ct, Mem. 1276 (i960).
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ran* supra  ̂note 9, Cliapter II, the covenant’s allocation 
gained in credlhility as a separate item because its pay­
ments were to stop if sellers competed, Hcnever, the con­
tractual agreement that payments for the covenant were to 
continue, even after seller’s death, in Benjamin Levinson. 
supra, note Chapter III, did not even gain admission as 
a concept in devaluing the covenant. Dismissing it from 
consideration, the court observed that , the payments
to other persons of any remaining installments in the event 
of (petitioner’s) death prior to (completion of the contract) 
we think, are immaterial,"
The courts appear to alternate in admitting the con­
cept of whether the parties had knowledge of the tax conse­
quences of the agreement into which they entered. Thus, in 
E. E. Suggs, supra, note 3, Cliapter I, the court stated tliat 
"It may well be that the sellers did not know . . . the tax 
consequences of the allocations in (paragraph containing the 
covenant), but that is iuimaterial as long as the contract was 
otherwise fully understood by the parties." Greater sympatliy 
was offered by the court, although the allocation was not 
changed, in John W, Eogere and Greta B. Bogers v. United States 
of America^^ when it was allowed that "Had there been any equi­
vocation or any confusion as to what was done (allocation to 
the covenant designated as ordinary income to sellers), then
lOj.W. Rogers. (GA-9), CGII 61-1 U.S. Tax Gas, Par, 9^7^» 
290 F, 2d 501 (1961).
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taxpayers would have had a far different case."
In William D. Allison and Sara L. Allison v. Congnis— 
sioner of Internal Revenne^  ̂ the concept that purchaser would 
not have "bought without a protective covenant was admitted as 
consideration in support of the covenant’s heing primarily to 
assure purchaser the benefit of the goodwill which he had 
bought, hence nons ever able from goodwill. The same concept 
in Benjamin Levinson, supra, note 4, Chapter III, and E. E. 
Suggs, supra. note 3» Cliapter I, was admitted as contributing 
to the opposite contention— that the covenant had been dealt 
with as a separate item.
When the agreement for sale and the covenant not to 
compete are contained in a single contract, the court might 
deem this as contributing evidence that the covenant is no 
more than protection of goodwill and, therefore, a capital 
asset. Such was the conclusion in Joseph FaulTcner. aipra. 
note 2, this chapter. On the other hand, this type of con­
tract may be acceptable in a matter similar to Ben Lichtman 
and Ruth Lichtraan. et al v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue^^ 
where $35,000 of a $40,000 purchase price was held to be for 
the covenant, severable from goodwill.
Finally, in the matter of Sidney Alper and Sydelle
^^W.D. Allison. 23 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 199 (1964), 
Lichtman. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1?45 (1964).
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Alper T* Conæai S3 loner of Internal ReTenue^3 the covenant’s 
separated allocation of $42,335 of the total proceeds of 
$35f000 was adjudged nons everahie from the goodwill purchased 
because the court saw it not as personal in nature, hut simply 
as a means for the buyers to decrease possible future competi­
tion and thereby protect goodwill* This concept was applied 
oppositely in Emmet te L« Bar ran, supra. note 9> Cliapter I, 
where one of the reasons advanced for designating the covenant 
as a severable item was that the buyers might have been will­
ing to effect such an agreement with anyone, without buying 
his business and goodwill, as a means of decreasing possible 
future competition* In one case decreasing competition contri­
buted to evidence that the covenant was nonseverable from good­
will, yet in another case the same concept was accepted in 
support of the opposite proposition*
The point of these examples, and there are many more, 
is that finding concepts which are certain to support one de­
sired designation is difficult to say the least when one is 
dealing with the designative criteria of the coveimnt not to 
compete* In all of these ejiamples, the same concept accrued 
to either designation* Thus, a taxpayer inay not talce a con­
cept, or a bimdle of them, from cases already decided and 
thereby assure himself of a similar outcome— even though his
Alper. 15 CCH Tax Ct* Mem. l4l5 (1956).
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concepts may seem to parallel those in other cases. The sum
of the concepts is not a guarantee of a desired designation
hecause each cas^s total context— -its collective facts and
circumstances—-will hear upon the alignment of each concept,
and each case will differ from its predecessors and successors.
Although the allocation and desigjiation may change,
the covenant’s protective features are not altered hy such
changes in its taxation. Once validated, or not invalidated,
the protection remains even though the consideration paid for
it may he drastically altered in after-taxes dollars.
For all of the other components to the sale, some kind
of reliable approach is available to secure a high degree of
certainty in the tax treatment. No precise means of valuing
or designating tlie covenant exists at this time, however, as
the preceding cases indicate, Periiaps it was after a study
of such cases that the National Association of Insurance Agents*
general legal counsel, George S, ilanson, v̂as prompted to write,
"The tax consequences of the purchase and sale of an insurance
agency cannot he stated in a categorical way"— almost every
sale of an insurance agency contains an agreement with a cove-
lUnantiot to compete.
Aside from the designative and allocative uncertain­
ties which result even with expert legal handling of a cove-
^^George S, Hanson, "Recent Tax Decisions on Purchase 
and Sale of Agencies," The American Agency Bulletin. (May, 
1961), distributed reprint.
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Miscellaneous Covenant Tax Pitfalls
The entrapments which contribute to tax uncertainties 
in this area can he divided into tno hroad types: (1) tech­
nicalities of the law, and (2) taxpayer-initiated difficulties. 
In the former category, a cure could he legal expertise, hut 
even with a higîily-skilled tax attorney, oversights can occur. 
The second division will not diminish until the hasic human 
personality is altered— as the cases used to illustrate it will 
show. Both of these areas represent elements of uncertainty 
wliich are hound to re-occur, and the inclusion of a covenant 
not to compete in the agreement for sale is the catalyst.
One of the legal pitfalls which sellers might encount­
er is best exemplified hy the case of Anthony Rock, supra, note 
8, this chapter. In this matter, Bock sold his stock interest 
in a dairy and designated part of the proceeds for the stock 
and part for a covenant not to compete— in the contract, Vfhen 
he filed his tax return, Rock treated the entire sum as pro­
ceeds from the sale of a capital asset and the Internal Reve­
nue Service disagreed. In the ensuing legal hattle, Rock based 
part of his argument on the contention that the covenant had 
heen given to insure the purchaser the beneficial enjoyment of 
the goodwill transferred and was, therefore, nonseverable from 
that goodwill. The argument lost all weight, however, when
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the court noted that stock had heen sold— evidence of owner­
ship of a huslness, not the business itself. Since stock­
holders liave no direct proprietary interest in goodwill, the 
covenant Ixad to he severable. Therefore, if stock is heing 
sold, taxpayers may not rely on the contention tliat an accom­
panying covenant is to insure the purchaser the beneficial 
enjoyment of goodwill heing transferred since no goodwill is 
heing transferred. This same factor applied to Charles W.
Balthrone, supra, note 6, this chapter, and to Pickering and 
Coigpanv. Inc. v, Goimnissioner of Internal Bevenue.
In jSelson Weaver Peal ty Company and Nelson «l eaver 
Mortgage Company. Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 
Nelson Weaver Mortgage Company, Inc., sold its mortgage 
servicing contract with the New York Life Insurance Company 
to a third party. Nelson Weaver Realty Company, which had 
written policies of dwelling insurance on the mortgaged prop­
erties, thought tliat it was also selling those policies* ex­
pirations to that same third iiarty. Realty Company accom­
panied the sale with an agreement not to solicit nor write 
the renewal policies on any of the dwellings whose mortgages 
were heing transferred for servicing. Because the mortgage 
records contained all of the inforination necessary to renew 
the insurance policies, in many cases containing the original
^^Pickorin/r & Co.. Inc.. 23 CCH Tax Ct, Mem, 466 (1964),
^%elson leaver Realty Co.. (CA-5)t CCh 62-2 U.S. Tax 
Cas. Par. 9719 (1962).
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policies, Realty Company saw no reason to furnish any of its 
insurance agency records to the purchaser. This ivas one of 
their do^mfalls in the case hecause the court held that the 
ahsence of tangible records of insurance heing transferred 
made it evident that expirations had not heen sold. Thus, 
no capital assets in the nature of goodwill— from an insur­
ance stnadpoint, the expiration records— were involved, and 
the covenant not to compete was the real benefit which the 
court saw being transferred as a separate item. This changed 
the tax designation of $3,000 of the proceeds to Kelson Weaver 
Realty Company from capital gain to ordinary income.
The second major category of miscellaneous pitfalls 
is taxpayer-initiated difficulties. Taxpayers often appear 
to he their own worst enemies in cases involving the covenant 
not to compete. Perliaps persons with the business acumen and 
personality complex capable of building a going concern which 
is salable have the fallibilities of special1 SKitlon and ex­
treme independence; Regardless of whether the problems are 
personality-derived, however, the following three cases will 
serve to illustrate this further area of uncertainty in the 
instance of the covenant not to compete.
In the matter of Thomas K. Yam'ell and Dorothy d, 
Yandell v. United States of America, M r ,  Yandell sold his
Yandell. (GA-9), CCH 63-1 U.S. Tax Gas, far, 
9366, 315 F, (2D) (1963).
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partnership interest in an acconnting firm through a contract 
which stated tliat the total consideration was heing paid to 
him for his covenant not to compete. As Mr. Yandell was an 
accountant, ho felt no need to engage a tax attorney to as­
sist liin. He was certain liy all rules of the ledger tliat he 
was selling fundamental goodwill no matter what the contract 
called it. The court was not as cognizant of good accounting 
practices as Yandell, however, and it held that his testimony 
in direct conflict idth the provisions of a written instrument 
freely signed hy him ivas of little weight. Therefore, his en­
tire proceeds were designated as ordinary income, despite Yan­
dell* s firm conviction that the whole matter was simply an 
error in terminology.
Mr. Ernest Suggs, in the case of S. E. Suggs, supra, 
note 3, Cliapter I, engaged and consulted with an attorney, 
hut liiB lawyer was not a tax specialist. When Suggs took the 
contract for the sale of M s  insurance agency, in its final 
pre-signing form with $50»250 of the total price of $72,000 
allocated to a covenant not to compete, to his counsel the 
latter advised some minor cMnges, hut completely overlooked 
the covenant’s sigMficanoe. This moved the court to note 
tliat, "It may well he that the sellers either did not Imow 
or entirely overlooked the tax consequences of the allocations 
in Paragraph 11 (the covenant), hut that is immaterial as long 
as the contract was otherwise fully understood hy the parties.”
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The court then designated the $50,250 tliat the Suggs had con­
templated as capital gain to he ordinary income.
Perhaps the party for whom one is least inclined to 
feel sycqmtliy in these matters is he who engages competent 
tax counsel, lawyer and accountant, and then disregards their 
advices. In the case of Benjamin Lichtman. supra. note 12, 
this chapter, the court also held little pity for petitioner 
when it designated $35,000 of the $40,000 proceeds from the 
sale of his laundry as ordinary income instead of capital 
gain. It was noted that the covenant’s allocation of $35,000 
had heen separately bargained for, valued, and agreed to by 
parties advised by competent tax counsel, Lichtman apparent­
ly was certain that the covenant would be nonseverable from 
goodwill and did not heed ezpert advices that it possibly 
could be severed,
No One Factor a Sole Determinant
It should be stressed that many other factors en­
tered into the decision in all of these cases. Although 
some concepts indicated may have had an apparently strong 
bearing on the outcome, in no case examined was aiy single 
item indexed as the entire basis of the promulgation. It 
is this matter of having to consider the total context of 
each case in order to accept, reject, weight, and align 
its concepts that makes each matter unique. Because of this 
singular nature, the cliangeling aspects of the covenant not
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to compete*s tas deBigmtive criteria make it an item of 
high risk— rmcertainty— from a tas staixlpoint,
Furtlier, where the other components are definable in 
mathematical terms, the covenant not to compete is a purely 
rhetorical item* It is defined in words, not accounting pro­
cedures, and it can he attacked rhetorically. Once given a 
legitimate hirtli, however, it can then he dealt with in ac­
counting terms.
Of course, there is a way to avoid the tax uncertain­
ties introduced hy the covenant not to compete— do not include 
one. Excluding tlie covenant, however, also excludes its pro­
tective qualities and its ability to assist in the mrketing 
of goodwill.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Protection Certainty Greater Due To Covenant
A covenant not to compete constitutes a contractual 
obligation of the seller. If reasonable In Its terms, the 
covenant Is legally valid and Its protective qualities for 
the buyer are achieved with a high degree of certainty. If 
unreasonable, however, the protection will be no less than 
that afforded in the absence of such an agreement. Further, 
a val Id covenant Is enforceable at law, and violations of 
Its restrictions entitle the injured party to seek relief enc/ 
or damages through the courts.
One possible detraction of some Import Is obvious to 
those who delve Into this nmtter to any extent, and it should 
be asserted at this point. Since there Is no way to be ab­
solutely certain of the protective features of a covenant, a 
measure of this consideration should be Injected Into every 
such bargaining series, A buyer could find himself in far 
worse circumstances if he believed a covenant ivas effective, 
bargained In price terms commensurately, and executed a con-
47
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■tract with a euhsequently-deemed imenforceahle covenant, than 
If he had dealt originally without a covenant. In such a 
situation, the purchase price would he higher due to belief 
in the covenant’s validity than it would have been in the 
absence of any contemplation of a covenant* Thus, at least 
a portion of the price paid would have gone for a non-exist­
ent asset— an unenforceable covenant. When no covenant is 
included in a sale of a going business, the buyer can assume 
a defensive price posture. In these cases, it is better not 
to have Txtrgained at all than to have bargained and lost.
As Chapter II indicated, however, the protective 
certainty afforded by a covenant with parameters of minimum 
reasonable time and provable geographic area is greater tlmn 
would exist in the case of no covenant. A high certainty 
of protection in such matters is a direct function of proper 
legal advice sought and followed. Further, price considera­
tions should be in terms of minimums of time and space as the 
maximums, i . e . -  outer feasible limits of three years for 
the time restriction and a definable, provable radius of past 
business transactions as the trade area constraint. In this 
manner, a conservative approach will reduce the chance of 
loss resulting from an invalidated covenant. With these 
qualifications, the first portion of the thesis* problem 
statement was activated affirmatively. To restate it, the 
certainty of protection is greater with a covenant not to 
compete.
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Tax Designation Certainty Diminished
As diapters III and IV indicated, the introduction 
of a covenant is accompanied by elements of uncertainty in 
designating the sale proceeds for federal income tax pur­
poses. A proper handling of the assets is a matter for 
considerable expertise without the complications of a third 
variable, the covenant not to compete. Hot only is the valu­
ation of a covenant a matter unique to each case, It is an 
item whose allocation and designation in the contract may 
have little or no bearing on the tax courts* findings. No 
appraisal experts or prior accounting functions are avail­
able in the uncharted grounds of the covenant.
The cases in Chapter IV illustrated tiiat the desig­
nation of the sale proceeds can be clianged, wholly or partial­
ly, from capital gain to ordinary income whether any part of 
the sale price was allocated to the covenant or not. Simi­
larly, with no established precedents to follow, any contrac­
tual allocation or designation may be wholly embraced or re­
jected by the courts. Of course, cases can be found (to a 
lesser extent) in which any of the assets* allocations and 
designations were changed. The point to be made for the cove­
nant, however, is that it enlmnces the uncertainties of the 
situation by constituting a more volatile variable which 
adds to the number of uncertainty combinations. It is, in a 
sense, exponential where the others are arithmetic. In any
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case, the degree of risk or uncertainty in the sale proceeds* 
tax designation is greater with a covenant than without it.
To illustrate this point, the cases chosen for Chap­
ter IT were of an exemplary nature in the area concerned.
They contained concepts of a basic nature, and it was demon­
strated that the same concept could aid in the establishment 
of either tax designation. Even in cases where expert coun­
sel had been employed, the matter was of such a controversial 
nature tliat legal gamesmanship became necessary to resolve 
many cases. Because of the fundamental character of these 
conflicts, and because of the continuing vague designative 
criteria, it can readily be expected that any number of fu­
ture tax court battles will have the same underlying struc­
ture, conceptually.
Conclusions
On the basis of the evidence revealed and analyzed 
by this study, the problem must be stated in the affirmative: 
Yes, the covenant not compete does achieve greater certainty 
of eliminating future competition from the seller at the 
cost of diminishing certainty in the federal income tax des­
ignation! s) of the purchase monies. Other conclusions in the 
nature of observations, advices, and comments are coincident 
with the purposes of the study, however, and will fortlurith 
be offered.
It is not within the province of this thesis, legally
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nor logically, to offer firm advice about the drafting of 
contracts. What will be given, in the interest of dissem­
inating information and thoughts, are suggestions of some 
approaches which the cases examined seem to indicate as 
favorable. In order to instill these implications with 
the property of emanating from a valid sampling, the sole 
frame of reference will be the thirty-one exemplary cases 
from Commerce Clearing House.
Among the cases indicated, certain concepts were 
conspicuous by their prevalence, or absence, from eitlier 
designation. Fourteen of the thirty-one cases were listed 
under a heading which categorized their designation outcome 
as capital asset, nonseverable from goodwill. The remaining 
seventeen cases comprised the separable, ordinary income 
designation outcome. Although it must lo noted again that 
no single concept was found which constituted the court’s 
sole determinant in promulgating a decision, some concepts 
appear to be amenable to forming a base upon which to build 
for a particular designation.
In nine of the fourteen cases which culminated in 
the capital asset designation of the covenant, no part of 
the purchase price was allocated to the covenant in the 
contract of sale. Further, in none of these cases was tie 
covenant contained in a separate instrument. Conversely, 
all seventeen ordinary income cases had some part of the
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proceeds specifically allocated to the covenant, and nine of 
these cases dealt with the covenant in a separate contract 
with a separate price designation. What is strongly evident 
here is that the courts have accepted the concept of separa- 
tioiv as evidenced hy the draftsmanship of the contracts, in 
support of the designative criterion for ordinary income, 
"dealt with as a separate item," Alternatively, the absence 
of such separation appears to accrue to the "nonseverable 
from goodwill" standard.
Transfers of personal service husinesses seem to he 
especially susceptible to uncertainty and ensuing litigation 
over the covenant’s designation. Of the thirty-one cases 
in Commerce Clearing House, the highest incidence of suit—  
five of the thirty-one cases— involves fire and casualty 
insurance agency sales. Second place on this dubious list 
is accorded to accounting firms with four of the cases cited. 
Drafting a covenant not to compete, both from the 
protective and tax designative viewpoints, is a matter of 
some degree of uncertainty and for technical expertise. 
Professional tax counsels— tax attorneys and accountants—  
are aware of this. Persons who engage in study and research 
in the particular realm of the covenant become cognisant of 
its powers and tax consequences. But professional business­
men, who are the immediately Interested parties to many con­
tracts containing the restrictive covenants and whose dollars 
are at stake, all too often do not realize fully the cove-
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na.nt*s implications. If their dollars and cents delibera­
tions are to culminate in a meaningful, after-taxes meeting 
of the minds, the advices of experts in the tax field are 
needed from the beginning of negotiations. As previously 
mentioned, the purchase price is the essence of a contract 
of sale, but the significant sum is that to be realized by 
both parties after taxes. Logically, any distortion of 
that bargained-for sum must result in an alteration of the 
original meeting of the minds.
As an example of the degree of careful draftsman­
ship requisite to the designation of an allocation to the 
covenant not to compete as ordinary income, some of the 
courts* judgment criteria in addition to those previously 
indicated ares (1) the covenant must be bargained for as 
a separate item in the total affair, not merely entered into 
a separate contractj (2) the value assigned to the covenant 
must have some independent Tmsis in fact and not be just a 
tax device; (3) the price allocated to the other assets m e t  
be realistic; (4) the contract Biust accurately reflect the 
parties* agreement reached at arm’s length with respect to 
the covenant; <5) the covenantor must have the capacity to 
compete.
The parties should consider and agree to the covenant 
not to compete*® allocation and designation so that they are 
clear about their desires. This process requires knowledge­
able assistance. Then the parties* desires must be entered
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Into a contract in such a form that the probability will be 
high for any subsequent tax authority or court to find only 
that which the parties intended. Again, the drafting excel­
lence of artisans is required. In summation, the admonition 
given to member-agents by the National Association of Insur­
ance Agents* chief legal counsel, George Hanson, is highly 
appropriate:
Some concepts of great value have been emerging 
from recent tax decisions. The most fundamental 
concept is that, whether the agent is buying or 
selling, professional legal and tax advice is es­
sential before the contract is entered into. Care­
ful draftsmanship of the purchase and sale con­
tract is essential. After the contract is signed, 
it is too late to change the tax consequences.
A proper contract entered into by parties with ade­
quate information on which to make their judgments is one 
which will reduce the necessity for the courts to construe. 
It is submitted that this will also elevate the probability 
that the parties* wishes will succeed, based as they are on 
expertise.
Final Observations
#uny of the cases examined culminated in ecanomic 
heartbreak for one of the parties involved. Although this
^George S. Hanson, "Recent Tax Decisions on Purchase 
and Sale of Agencies," The American Agency Bulletin (May, 
1961), distributed reprint.
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adversity was severe in many cases, coincident with it was 
evidence that it was often a function of people trying to 
arrive at proper judgments armed with inadequate or improper 
information. In some few cases, however, where the advised 
careful draftsmanship and expert counsel was present, the 
courts still found contrary to the contractually-stated al­
locative and designative terms, V.Tiile this study could of­
fer little hope to those who dealt from positions of ignor­
ance, it was going to propose a remedy for the well-conceived 
cases' adverse outcomes which would establish near-ultimate 
certainty for those prudent enough to seeîc and follow proper 
ascriptions.
As a final observation, therefore, this study was 
going to recommend that the courts and the Internal Revenue 
Service concur on a rule which would force all parties to 
follow the allocations and designations agreed to in the 
contract for sale, excepting only otherwise illegal contracts. 
Thus, those who would make themselves ar-are of this rule 
could deal with great certainty about the tax treatment of 
their sal© proceeds. Before the study was concluded, however, 
it was discovered that the Internal levenae Service had al­
ready made such a recommendation to the courts in a 1?65 case, 
Carl L, Danielson and Pauline L. Danielson, et al. v. Com­
missioner of Internal Revenue.2 where the court noted that;
Respondent vigorously urges us to adopt a new "rule"
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
56
of law conceming the treatment of such written cove­
nants, The proposed "rule" would prevent either con­
tracting party thereto or the respondent from subse­
quently attacking the stated consideration in such 
agreements unless fraud, duress, or undue influence 
existed at the time they were signed . . .
We are unwilling to abdicate our judicial respon­
sibilities of examining the substance of a transaction. 
We are not bound by its form. We are under no obliga­
tion to restrict ourselves to the written documents 
evidencing covenants not to compete, which, of course, 
would prevent us from arriving at a decision based on 
all the pertinent facts.
With this pronouncement, the court effectively emas­
culated wîiat was to have been this study’s recoimnendation 
for the resolution of the problem. Perhaps the best advice 
to be offered is to restrict oneself to dealings with men 
of good will and sound loiowledge. Further, one should be­
ware of petty men in all dealings for no contract can be 
written or adjudicated to afford protection from such as they.
After reading the works of iîalthus, Thomas Carlyle 
was led to call economics the "dismal s c i e n c e . B a s e d  upon 
the fino,l outcomes of its research, this study would propose 
tliat the attempt to inquire scientifically into the federal 
income tax treatment of the covenant not to compete be deemed 
the contemporary "disiaal science,"
^Robert L, Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers (Kew 
York: Simon and Schuster, Inc,, 1961), p, 61,
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